CRITICAL ITEMS LIST (CIL)

SYSTEM:

SUBSYSTEM:

Propulsion/Mechanical LH2 Penetrations

REV & DATE: DCN & DATE: ANALYSTS:

J, 12-19-97 002, 2-28-99 R. Kimzey

FUNCTIONAL CRIT:

PHASE(S):

a,b

HAZARD REF:

S.06, S.11

FAILURE MODE:

Leakage

FAILURE EFFECT:

Loss of mission and vehicle/crew due to fire/explosion b) Loss of mission and vehicle/crew due to fire/explosion.

TIME TO EFFECT:

Seconds

A:

FAILURE CAUSE(S):

Scratched/Nicked/Misaligned

B: Deterioration

C: Flange Mating Surface Defects D: Fracture of One Closure Cap Bolt

REDUNDANCY SCREENS:

Not Applicable

FUNCTIONAL DESCRIPTION: Prevents leakage of GHZ/LH2 between the LH2 aft dome siphon fitting closure plate and the

siphon closure cap.

FMEA ITEM

PART NO.

PART. NAME

QTY

EFFECTIVITY

2.10.11.1

55L2-1

Raco Seal

1

LWT-89 thru 599

REMARKS:

CRITICAL ITEMS LIST (CIL) CONTINUATION SHEET

SYSTEM: SUBSYSTEM: Propulsion/Mechanical LH2 Penetrations 2.10.11.1

REV & DATE: DCN & DATE: J, 12-19-97

FMEA ITEM CODE(S):

RATIONALE FOR RETENTION

DESIGN:

The Raco seal is installed between the siphon fitting closure plate on the aft dome and the siphon closure cap. This is a new design for SLWT to accommodate the elimination of the bolted manhole cover for weight savings. The seal is fabricated by furon and is similar to seals that were qualified and used on Atlas, Centaur, and Saturn IC, II and IVB vehicles. The design consists of a U shaped circular spring with a Teflon jacket. The spring force assisted by media pressure is adequate to provide a seal between the Teflon jacket and adjacent mating surfaces.

- Improper handling and installation leads only to leakage which is detected by test. If the flange joint A: is disassembled, seal replacement is specified and controlled by STP2012.
- Procurement of seals is governed by material, fabrication, processing, test and inspection specifications B: per MMC Standard drawing 55L2. Teflon material compatibility testing is specified for oxygen service (NHB 8060.1).
- Mating surface flatness, waviness, and finish are specified on engineering drawings to assure performance within the capability of the seal. C:
- D; Attachment fasteners were selected from the Approved Standard Parts List (ASPL 826-3500), installed per STP2014 and torqued using values specified on Engineering drawings. Procurement of fasteners is by material, fabrication, processing, test and inspection specifications per MMC Standard Drawing 26L3.

TEST:

The Raco Seal is certified. Reference HCS MMC-ET-TMO8-L-P007.

Qualification: Thirty Raco seals, six samples of five different sizes ranging from 4 inches to 17 inches diameter, were leak tested after being subjected to pressure temperature cycling, vibration, proof pressure and burst pressure. Testing included two samples that were subjected to 62 psig at LH2 temperature without degradation of performance.

The tests show that the seals are capable of preventing major leakage under ET operating conditions. Leakage measured during exposure was significantly less than allowable (MMC-ET-RAD9-4).

Acceptance:

<u>Vendor</u>:

- A, C: Perform dimensional fit and leakage tests (ATPOO4, Furon).
- D: Attachment bolts are procured and tested to Standard drawing 26L3.

MAF:

A-D: Perform seal leakage test after installation (MMC-ET-TMO4k),

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Propulsion/Mechanical

LH2 Penetrations

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RATIONALE FOR RETENTION

INSPECTION:

Vendor Inspection - Lockheed Martin Surveillance:

B, D: Verify material selection and verification controls (MMC-ET-SE16 and standard drawings 55L2 and 26L3).

C: Inspect critical sealing surface flatness, finish and dimensions (drawing 80911001445).

C. Inspect critical sealing surface finish and dimensions (drawing 80914930989).

Lockheed Martin Procurement Quality Representative:

A, C: Witness dimensional fit and leakage tests (ATPOO4, Furon).

MAF_Quality Inspection:

A: Inspect (visually) seal surfaces for freedom of nicks, radial scratches or other imperfections during installation (drawing 80911001449).

A, C, Verify installation and witness torque (drawing 80911001449).

C: Inspect sealing surfaces for freedom of nicks, radial scratches or other imperfections during installation (acceptance drawing 82620000001).

A-D: Witness seal leakage test (MMC-ET-TMO4k).

Launch Site:

A-D: Visually monitor LH2 aft dome during ET loading for no leakage (GMRSD File II).

FAILURE HISTORY:

Current data on test failures, unexplained anomalies and other failures experienced during ground processing activity can be found in the PRACA data base.